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Abstract 
The research question we wish to investigate is the degree to which different countries with differing levels of NSI 
strength and weakness cope in mitigating some of the adverse impacts of the recession. In general during the 
recession confidence declines or what Keynes calls the „animal spirit‟. Creative destruction is heightened as firms 
destroyed need to find other ways of recreating their economic activities. Exports and imports change. Investment 
from abroad declines and consumers afraid of the recession save or even hoard. Such a state is likely to impact those 
who are absorbing FDI and exporting to the heartland of the current recession which is the US market. China and 
India both export mainly hardware and software related goods and services respectively to this market where 
reduction in demand has resulted in company closures and unemployment. Even free trade has been challenged with 
protectionist and nationalist rhetoric on the rise during this recession. 
Given a recession that has affected the entire world economy and its constituent parts, both the way the recession 
impacts on different national economies and the ability of national economies to mitigate the recession are likely to 
be different. This paper concentrates on the latter not on the former per se. We examine what mitigating capability 
different national innovation systems have in relation to dealing with and responding to the current world financial 
and economic crises. The hypothesis we would like to test with descriptive comparative data is how far the relative 
strength or weakness of the NSI is capable of mitigating the adverse impact of the recession. We assume that that the 
nature and degree of impact of the recession across countries are likely to be different.   In this paper we would like 
to take only the NSI factor in trying to account how such differences due to the individual characteristics of NSIs 
across different countries mitigate recessionary impact on given economies.  For this, we propose to examine 
selected sectors from selected emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa (BRICS excluding 
Russia) to estimate mitigating capabilities of different NSIs.  
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1. Introduction 
The current global recession and financial crisis was triggered in 2007 by the collapse of the sub-
prime mortgage market in the US, affecting almost all countries and all sectors of the global 
economy.  The developed countries in the West appear to have experienced the immediate 
impact and are going through one of the worst recessions. The credit crunch put severe 
constraints on lending between banks and triggered a series of chain reactions in the economies 
of Western countries particularly which subsequently affected consumer willingness and power 
to spend on goods and services and it also severely affected the investment in the corporate 
world.  According to the United Nations (UN) the world growth is estimated to decline from 3.7 
per cent in 2007 to 1.0 per cent in 2009. Also, since mid-2008 commodity prices have dropped 
sharply due to weakened demand.  In 2008, due to the impact of the financial crisis the European 
Union (EU) grew at a rate of 1.1 per cent.   As the growth for 2009 is projected to remain low in 
2009, both domestic demand and exports are expected to remain weak across the world. The 
direct and indirect effects of the financial crisis in the Western developed economies on other 
regions are expected to be very significant.  Developing countries are likely to be affected by 
lower demand for exports, reduced commodity prices, reduced capital inflows, delayed 
investments, and exchange rate volatility (United Nations 2009; AfDB et al, 2008, Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2008). 
 
The likely nature and shape of impact of the recession in the advanced economies on the 
developing world and the emerging economies have attracted a lot of attention and the world 
multilateral institutions such the UN and IMF have come up with reports and individual experts 
have made some observations and statements.  There seems to be a consensus that among the 
developing and emerging economies some countries will be affected the most severely than 
others due to economy-specific factors and characteristics. For example, in the banking/ financial 
sector which triggered the credit crunch in the developed economies which in turn accelerated 
the recession it is argued that the emerging economies such as BRICS would not be affected to 
the extent of developed economies.  At the same time it is also argued that there are significant 
differences in the impact on even the banking/financial sectors among the BRICS economies 
(Poshakwale, 2008).  For example, a study by Credit Suisse has shown that China is least 
affected by the credit crunch, India is facing domestic liquidity problem (Financial Chronicle, 9 
December 2008).  In case of South Africa, it is argued that the impact of credit crunch is unlikely 
to be severe, mainly due to the nature of domestic banking regulatory regime enforced by the 
South African Reserve Bank which assured strong stability (Donohoe, 2008).   Similarly, while it 
is believed that the overall impact on the banking/ financial sector will not be severe, already the 
credit crunch in the US appears to have significantly reduced access to bank lending and capital 
markets. This in turn appears to have affected big investment projects in the infrastructure and 
energy sectors (International Herald Tribune, 03 November 2008). Therefore, the early evidence 
emerging from these case countries suggest that the nature and degree of impact of the recession 
in these economies are different. 
 
This caught our attention and we came up with the argument that these differences are mainly 
due to the nature and distinct characteristics of the NSIs in these economies other things being 
equal. We propose to examine how far the relative strength or weakness of the NSI within the 
transition economies of the BRICS is capable of mitigating the adverse impact of the recession. 
For this, in this paper we would like to take only the NSI factor in trying to account how the 
nature and degree of impact of the recession across countries are likely to be different due to the 
individual characteristics of NSIs across different countries within the transition economies of 
the BRICS and not necessarily the already developed economies which have ran into trouble by 
following largely misguided policies and strategies in managing boosts and busts in the business 
cycles. Our assumption is that those in the developed economies have underlying strength in 
their NSI that allows them sooner or later to cope and come out of the recession. Those in the 
low income countries will suffer severely as their overall NSI is very weak. And the impact of 
the recession that they had hardly any thing to do in creating will be more severe. The most 
interesting test for the NSI‟s contribution in generating a mitigating capability lies with the 
current transition countries with plans to emerge with developed country status variously with 
2020(India), South Africa(2030) and others like China and Brazil. 
 
The question is in these transition economies which the BRICS represent to what degree is the 
relative strength or weakness of the NSI capable of mitigating the adverse impact of the world 
recession that is currently affecting them?  To show this, we propose to examine selected sectors 
from selected emerging or transition BRIC economies such as China, India, Brazil and South 
Africa (BRICS excluding Russia).  We expect our research would advance new insights both to 
the significance and value of strengthening the NSI and how a potential to mitigate the severity 
of the global recession in emerging economies is associated with NSI development in given 
transition economies. This paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents a conceptual 
framework to link and analyse the NSI and its potential mitigating impact on global recession; 
section 3 to 6 presents individual cases (Brazil, South Africa, China and India respectively), 
section 7 provides analysis of the cases and finally section 8 presents our conclusions and policy 
recommendations. 
 
2. National System of Innovation (NSI) and its Potential Mitigating Impact on Recession: A 
Conceptual Framework 
 
A system of innovation, in general, brings together all the significant economic, social, political, 
organisational, institutional and other factors and their interactions which come together and 
influence the development, diffusion, and application of innovations. Though interest in the 
innovation systems approach have grown since the 1980s, its origin dates back to the nineteenth 
century catch up aspirations of economies like that of Germany with Britain. 
 
Friedrich List (1856) and his concept national production system may be seen as the historical 
origin of the national system of innovation (Freeman, 1995). Since then, the innovation system 
concept has evolved over the years (List 1856; Freeman, 1982, 1987, 1995; Lundvall, 1988, 
1992; Nelson, 1993; and Edquist, 1997).  Some scholars have drawn affinities to it with the 
French Regulation School, and theories of evolutionary and institutional economics in the 
tradition of Schumpeter (1934) and Veblen (1919).  According to Bengt-Åke Lundvall, the 
modern version of the concept appeared first in an unpublished contribution to OECD by 
Freeman (1982).  Subsequently, Lundvall (1985) used the concept in formulating producer-user 
interaction and feedback for learning. NSI approach has been increasingly used to understand 
building technological capabilities and industrialisation process in developing countries (e.g. 
Cimoli (2000); Intarakumnerd and Chaaminade (2007); Viotti (2001).  Furthermore, there have 
been attempts to broaden the national innovation system to include directly problems and 
challenges of development and underdevelopment.  For example, Muchie and others (2003) 
attempt to apply the concept for economies in the developing world in general including Africa 
in particular. This new approach has been stimulated by the Globelics network (see Website A) 
which links modes of innovation systems to the processes of economic development, and tries to 
bridge the gap that may exist between innovation system dynamics and economic development 
by focusing on the determinants of innovative, learning and competence building activities in the 
development processes. NSI provides the conceptual approach or framework for studying both 
developed and developing economies at various stages of development. We adopt NSI 
conceptual framework to investigate the degree to which different BRICS countries with 
differing levels of NSI strength and weakness cope in mitigating some of the adverse impacts of 
the recession.  This is done by first identifying those elements of NSI which could have 
significant impact on the effectiveness of recession. 
 
In the narrow sense NSI involves a system of interaction of  a wide variety of public and/ or 
private firms with other institutions such as universities, and government agencies -- all working 
together towards attaining the production and diffusion of knowledge and science, technology, 
and innovation within the boundaries of legally recognised states. The form of the interaction can 
take both technical and non-technical dimensions.  It could be organisational, institutional, 
commercial, physical, human, mental, legal, social, and financial interactions.  The broader goal 
of such interactions is the socio-economic development, regulation, and support for new science, 
technology, innovation within the country by dealing with and responding to both internal and 
external challenges. 
 
The SI has four key elements.  The first set involves the ideas and policies that frame the overall 
scope or possible set of interactions of politics, economics and knowledge (e.g. government 
action, industrial production and knowledge creation by research institutions), given the internal 
and external social and economic constraints facing a particular NSI.  The behaviour and 
interactions are often shaped by sets of common habits, norms, routines, established practices, 
rules, or laws. 
 
The second set involves the choice or the selection and actual construction or implementation of 
the set of interactions that bring to bear the conceptual framing and policies selected above (the 
first set) with the institutions and elements that interact to build the NSI.  
The third set involves the means provided to the institutions (second set) for realising the goals 
set (first set), that is, various incentives such as financial and social rewards.  This is vital to 
foster appropriate incentive system which is consistent with the goals and objectives set  and is 
seen as fair and legitimate and command wider acceptance by various components forming the 
NSI.  If the incentive system is inappropriate or fails to command wider acceptance, the 
opportunity to organise robust NI system and achieve measureable results will be put in 
jeopardy. 
The fourth set highlights the overall efficiency of the environment for learning in terms of 
implementation, monitoring, review, and feedback involving the above three sets.  The learning 
outcomes can be different such as transformative, adaptive, corrective, modifying, evolutionary, 
redesigning, and so on.  This can also be negative.   The relationships between these four sets of 
elements that constitute NSI are illustrated by Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NSI
 Elements Set 1:
Conceptual Framing
Articulating the interaction among 
politics, economics and knowledge 
(e.g. Government action, Industrial 
production, and Knowledge 
creation by Research Institutions).
 Elements Set 2:
  Institutions, Industry, 
Technologies, and Knowledge
Need strong interaction, linkages, synergies, 
and co-ordination between Institutions, 
Industry, Technologies, and Knowledge to 
achieve more efficient innovation system and 
higher level of technology accumulation 
  Elements Set 4: 
Implementation/
 Learning Outcomes and Changes 
Implementation of strategies, policies and 
programmes should include feedback 
mechanisms 
 Ability to learn and ability to take corrective 
measures are imperative for building 
technological capabilities and imbed innovation 
dynamics in industrial and socio-economic 
development 
Learning outcomes could lead to different types 
of socio-economic changes – corrective, 
adaptive, evolutionary, modifying, and so on 
(Transformation/ Regressive)
  Elements Set 3:
 Incentives,  Investment and 
Infrastructure: 
Appropriate infrastructure, 
investment and incentives to 
institutions lead to co-evolutionary 
dynamics between institution, 
technology, and knowledge 
production by linking economic 
and non-economic agents.
Figure 1: Four Major Sets of Elements of National System of Innovation (NSI)
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 2, we elaborate Set 2 (Institutions, Industry, Technologies and Knowledge), and Set 3 
(Incentives, Investment and Infrastructure) from Figure 1.  These are relevant to making linkages 
and relations between NSI and recession. The strong presence and interaction and linkages 
between various institutions, industrial sectors, technologies, knowledge, incentives, investment, 
and infrastructure determine the higher or relatively stronger or weaker level of functioning of a 
particular NSI.  We would argue that the relative strength of an NSI can have a mitigating impact 
on recession.  We attempt to indentify specific elements of NSI that could have significant 
mitigating impact on recession.  We identified 6 sets of components of NSI as shown in Table 1. 
These are part of 4 sets of major NSI elements that are identified in Figure 1.  Figures 2 
elaborates further the NSI elements set 2 and 3 which helps to make a link between NSI elements 
and their potential mitigating impact on recession.   These NSI elements and components of 
these elements are largely derived from the Word Investment Reports published by the UNCTAD 
(e.g. 2002, 2003, 2005) and NSI literature. 
 
 
Strong /Weak Linkages 
between Major Elements of NSI
Well functioning/Strong 
Or Relatively Strong
Or Non-functioning/ Weak 
National System of Innovation
 
 Investment &  
Infrastructure:
Investment (public & private), 
Venture capital, and Foreign 
direct investment (FDI).
Macro-economic & fiscal policy,
Science & Technology policy, 
Intellectual property rights, 
Government R&D support,  
ICT infrastructure.
   Incentives:
Economic and Regulatory Incentives -- 
Incentives to Exports
Trade and tax policies
Return on R&D investments, 
Appropriability through Intellectual 
Property,  Competitive Market and 
Pricing,
 Hybrid Incentives - Public funding with 
Intellectual property, i.e. 
Industry-Government research 
partnership, Recognition and financial 
reward, and Regulatory standards that 
drive new  innovations.
 Institutions and Relations:
Domestic Market/ Structure
Domestic and Foreign firms, 
Universities, Public R&D 
organisations, Financial 
institutions, University-Industry, 
-Public R&D Relations, 
Transnational Networks.
  Industry, Technologies and 
Knowledge: 
Different Industrial Sectors: Natural 
Resources-Mining, Manufacturing, 
Automobile, Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotechnology, Agro-food, Aviation, 
Space & Defence, ICT and Services. 
Education system, Human resources 
development, and Skills flexibility and 
mobility.
Figure 2: 
Linkages Between Some Major Elements of NSI
 (Elaboration of Elements Set 2- Institutions, Industry, Technologies, Knowledge; and Elements Set 3- Incentives, 
Investment and Infrastructure in Figure 1)
Table 1: Some Major Components of NSI that Could have Mitigating Impact on 
Recession 
Components of NSI that could Impact on 
Recession 
Related to the Elements of NSI 
(As shown in Figures 1 and 2) 
1. The general investment climate and 
economic policy framework:  
 
(a)Macroeconomic and social stability 
(b) National fiscal policy regime 
(c) Foreign debt 
(d) Inflation 
(e) Interest rate, and Exchange rate   
(f) Regulatory regime such as trade and 
tax policies 
(g) Nature and role of FDI  
 
NSI Elements Set 1 and Set 3 (Figure 1) 
Investment & Infrastructure, and 
Incentives (Figure   2) 
2. Market, per capita income,  domestic 
savings:  
 
(a) Domestic market size / structure 
(b) Links to regional and global markets 
(c) Domestic savings growth 
 
NSI Elements Sets 2(Figure 1) 
Institutions and Relations (Figure 2) 
3. Industrial structure:  
 
(a) Presence of diverse industrial 
structure  
(b) Strength of domestic firms 
(c) Presence and role of foreign firms 
(d) Links to foreign companies/ foreign 
financial market 
NSI Elements Sets 2 and Set 3 (Figure 1) 
Institutions, Investment & Infrastructure, 
and Incentives (Figure 2) 
4. Financial Institutions: 
(a) Banking sector 
(b) Role and effectiveness of the Central 
Bank 
(c) Links to foreign financial market 
NSI Elements Set 2 (Figure 1) 
Institutions, Industry Sectors, 
Technologies and Knowledge (Figure 2) 
5. Foreign Trade: 
 
(a) Nature of exports/ Imports 
(b) Export markets (Destinations) 
(c) Dependence on commodity exports 
NSI Elements Set 2 and Set 3 (Figure 1) 
Industry, Technologies and Knowledge; 
and Incentives (Figure 2) 
6. Skills, R&D, and Technology 
development 
(a) Investment in education and skills 
(human resources) development 
(b) Investment in R&D 
NSI Elements Set 2 and Set 3 (Figure 1) 
Industry, Technologies and Knowledge; 
and Incentives (Figure 2) 
1. General investment 
climate and economic policy 
framework: 
Macroeconomic and social 
stability
National fiscal policy regime
Foreign debt
Inflation
Interest and Exchange rates 
Regulatory regime such as 
trade and tax policies
Nature and role of FDI 
NSI
5 Sets of Major Components of NIS that could have Mitigating Impact on Recession 
Developed NSIs
(US, EU, and Japan)
Transition NSIs
(BRICS, NICSs)
Weaker/ Low Income NSIs
(Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin 
America, South Asia)
2. Market, per capita 
income,  domestic savings: 
Domestic market size / 
structure
Links to regional and global 
markets
Domestic savings
Growth
3. Industrial structure: 
Presence of diverse industrial 
structure 
Strength of domestic firms
Presence and role of foreign 
firms
Links to foreign companies/ 
foreign financial market
 
4. Financial Institutions:
Banking sector
Role and effectiveness of the 
Central Bank
Links to foreign financial market
5. Foreign Trade:
Nature of exports
& imports
Export markets (Destinations)
Dependence on commodity 
exports
 NSI Types and Impacts 
Strong, or Relatively strong or Weak mitigating impact on recession.
(Depending on the interactions and linkages between these NSI 
components)
6. Skills, R&D, & Technology 
Development:
Investment in skills & education
Investment in R&D
Figure 3
Strength of National System of  Innovation and its Mitigating Impact on Recession: 
A Conceptual Framework
 
 
Figure 3 presents a conceptual framework linking 6 major sets of NSI components (which are 
identified under the 4 major sets of NSI elements as shown in Figure 1) to the mitigating impact 
of NSI on recession.  The degree of strength of these NSI components and interaction between 
them will make an NSI as either developed, transition, or weaker/ low income.  The important 
issue we are highlighting here is that although there are many similarities between systems of 
innovation, there are also differences related to the stage of development, characteristics of NSI 
evolution, path dependency, institutions, laws, policies, and incentives. These in turn are likely to 
have either strong, relatively strong or weak mitigating impact on recession. That is, if a country 
has a well functioning or strong 6 sets of NSI components identified in Table 2 and Figure 3, it is 
likely to witness high mitigating impact on recession. On the other hand, if a country has a non-
functioning or weak 6 sets of NSI components, it is likely to witness no or little mitigating 
impact on recession. If a country has a relatively well functioning 6 sets of NSI components, then 
it is likely to have a relatively strong mitigating impact on recession.  
 
What we mean by mitigating capability is the ability of NSI to deal with and respond to 
unforeseen or foreseen crisis that could be induced internally or externally or by the combination 
of both domestic and internationals factors. The tendency is towards restricting or contraction of 
the economy due to changes in business cycle or recessionary down turn in economic activity. 
Therefore the key to see mitigative capability is how NSI components respond and deal with this 
challenge.  So, we correlate the NSI components to the recessionary downturn to explore 
whether they can cope or not.  This is done by using indicative and descriptive data. For 
example, we take the GDP and see whether they have contracted or is it still growing, or reduced 
severely or slightly.  We try to show through this the underlying economic strength or weakness 
or relative strength or weakness of the NSI to deal with the recessionary crisis. 
 
We are contributing by adding to the existing body of NSI literature by linking NSI framework 
to its potential mitigating impact on recession in national economies.  The way we did this 
theoretically is first to identify the four sets of elements that constitutes the NSI and then identify 
6 sub-elements or components of NSI (as shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3 and Table 1) and try to 
conceptualize whether and how weak or strong they can have mitigating impact on recession.  In 
actual fact we are looking for making a paradigm change of the way economic development and 
recession can be appreciated by employing NSI framework.   
 
To illustrate this empirically we analyse NSIs of BRICS economies using descriptive and 
secondary data.  In the following sections the potential mitigating impact of NSIs of BRICS 
economies on recession will be analysed employing the conceptual framework illustrated by 
Figure 3. 
 
3. The Case of Brazil 
It is argued that despites its negative experience in the1970s and 1980s when it went through 
financial miss-management. Spiraling inflation, massive debts and a chronic history of currency 
devaluation, Brazil is expected to escape or overcome serious negative impacts of the current 
global recession for number of factors.  These included: (i) strong fiscal regime followed in 
recent years; (ii) significant reduction of foreign debts in recent years; (iii) low inflation; (iv) 
steady lowering of interest rate; (v) relatively strong currency which appreciated about 8% 
against the US$ over 2007; (vi) continuing bank lending at a steady pace while Europe and the 
US witnessed significant reduction; (vii) total “stock of credit” is just 35% of GDP and “overall 
credit markets are calm (i.e. much less leveraged than many other financial markets); (viii) main 
source of credit has been the increasing domestic savings; (ix) firms carry much lower debt loads 
compared to foreign competitors; (x) increasing “investments in fixed income securities that are, 
in effect, closed to foreigners” due to taxation issues; (xi) firms are relying on the domestic 
market to make up the difference due to global downtrend; (xii) firms are still able to access 
investment capital (Burnick, 2008).  According to a BBC report Brazil is likely to overcome the 
negative impact of credit crunch without serious problems. It pointed out that until mid-2008 
Brazil did not face serious problems from the global credit crunch and it encouraged foreign 
investors.  Also, mortgage finance is available relatively easily and also the stable economy has 
helped consumers to buy wide range of goods (BBC, 06 August 2008). 
 
Brazil witnessed significant economic performance in the first three quarters of 2008.  Compared 
to same period in 2007, GDP has grown 6.4%, 2 million more jobs created, the unemployment 
rate down to 7.6% and a 5.1% rise in real wages. Brazil was able to manage the inflation rate 
close to target level, and retain significant surplus fiscal balance due to the lower cost of debt 
servicing 9 5.6% of GDP in the period January-October 2008) and had small public sector deficit 
(0.33% of GDP ).  Despite the expectation that the global crisis will have a negative impact on 
fiscal revenues, a number of areas registered strong performance. For example, manufacturing 
was up 6.5% on the year-earlier period (due to a 17.6% rise in automobile production and an 
18.9% increase in capital goods production), while commerce expanded by 10.4%, and 
agricultural production was also up by 10%, merchandise exports rose by 28% and imports also 
increased by 51.6% (i.e. consumer durables 56.1%, capital goods 40.3%, and intermediate goods 
20.9%) (ECLAC, 2008,pp.86-87) .  
 
 
Table 2: Brazil: Main Economic Indicators -- I 
Indicators 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
Growth Rates of GDP (%) 4.2 4.3 5.7 3.2 4.0 5.7  
(5.9)
+ 
Growth Rates of Per Capita GDP (%) 2.6 2.8 4.2 1.5 2.3 4.0 
(4.5)
 +
 
GDP at Constant Market Prices (2000) 
– US$ billion 
583.4 644.5 716.7 739.4 768.7 812.3 
Per Capita GDP at Constant Market 
Prices (2000) – US$  
3601.0 3688.6 3873.0 3941.1 4043.1 4216.5 
GDP at Current Market Prices - US$ 
billion 
769.0 644.5 663.7 882.0 1089.4 1300.3 
Per Capita GDP at Current Market 
Prices – US$ million 
4746.1 36886.6 3586.7 4701.7 5729.8 6749.8 
Aggregate Value of Agriculture, 
Hunting, Forestry and Fishing
*
  
26.6 31.3 38.3 38.4 40.1 42.5 
Aggregate Value of Mining and 7.6 8.9 11.1 12.1 12.6 13.0 
Quarrying
*
  
Aggregate Value of Manufacturing
*
  95.0 96.1 109.6 110.9 112.2 117.5 
Aggregate Value of Electricity, Gas, 
and Water sectors
* 
  
16.4 19.0 20.6 21.3 22.0 23.3 
Aggregate Value of Construction 
sector
*
  
27.5 30.8 30.4 31.0 32.4 34.0 
Aggregate Value of Whole sale & 
Retail Trade, Hotels, Bars, and 
Restaurants
*
  
61.9 65.6 69.7 72.1 76.3 81.8 
Aggregate Value of Transport, Storage 
and Communications
*
  
36.1 47.3 53.6 55.6 56.7 60.1 
Aggregate Value of Finance, 
Insurance, Real Estate, and Business 
Services
*
  
86.6 96.3 107.7 112.9 118.4 127.6 
Aggregate Value of Community, 
Social and Personal Services
*
  
146.4 162.9 184.3 189.1 195.9 200.7 
Total Aggregate Value of Economic 
Activity
*
 
504.1 558.2 625.3 643.4 666.7 700.5 
Source: ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2008, New York: 
United Nations. 
 
* At Constant Market Prices (2000) – US$ billion  
+ 2008 figure 
 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 present some main economic indicators for Brazil. Table 2 shows that the rate 
of GDP has slowed down in 2005 and 2006 and it picked up again from 2007 and continued to 
perform better until 2008.  This is also reflected in growth rates of per capita GDP (%).  It also 
shows the importance of agriculture and mining, manufacturing, financial sector and real estates 
to the total value of the aggregate value of economic activity.  These are the areas which appear 
to have been affected by the current global crisis. Table 3 shows that the level of both exports 
and imports are same in 2007, except that the exports have been growing slowly while the 
imports have been growing faster.  The growth of national savings over the years has been 
significant.  Brazil also has seen its debt payments increasing steadily.  Table 4 shows that the 
rate of growth of consumer prices has been significant (from 4.5% in 2007 to 6.4% in 2008), but 
the real wage has not grown significantly.  Brazil has seen current account surplus of US$13.6b 
in 2006 reduced to deficit of 27.8US$. 
 
 
Table 3: Brazil: Main Economic Indicators - II 
Indicators 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
Gross Capital Formation 
*
  109.3 117.6 117.2 114.8 127.2 145.2 
Fixed Gross Capital Formation
*
  102.1 108.3 107.3 111.1 120.8 137.0 
Exports of Goods and Services
*
  46.5 64.3 96.7 101.5 111.4 118.7 
Imports
*
 66.5 75.7 76.2 83.3 98.3 118.7 
Disposable Gross National Income
*
 582.4 628.1 699.0 722.6 759.5 808.6 
Factor Payments to the Rest of the -11.1 17.9 -20.5 -26.0 -27.5 -29.3 
World  (at Current Prices –US$ 
billion) 
Net Current Transfers from the Rest of 
the World (at Current Prices –US$ 
billion) 
3.62 1.52 3.23 3.56 4.31 4.02 
National Savings (at Current Prices –
US$ billion) 
120.5 93.4 125.3 156.9 196.3 232.3 
Source: ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2008, New York: 
United Nations. 
 
* At Constant Market Prices (2000) – US$ billion 
 
Table 4: Brazil: Main Economic Indicators - III 
Indicators 2006 2007
 
2008 
Consumer Prices (annual growth rate %) 3.0 4.5 6.4 
Average Real wage (annual growth rate %) 3.5 1.5 1.7 
Money (M1) 20.4 32.7 7.4 
National currency – Real – Effective exchange rate 
(year-on-year average variation) 
-11.5 -7.7 -8.8 
Exports of Goods and Services (Current prices – US$ 
billion) 
157.3 184.5 229.9 
Imports of Goods and Services (Current prices – US$ 
billion) 
120.5 157.5 222.7 
Current Account (US$ billion) 13.6 1.7 -27.8 
Capital and Financial Account 16.9 85.8 54.8 
Overall Balance 30.6 87.5 27.0 
Source: ECLAC (2008), Preliminary Overview of Economies of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 2008, New York: United Nations. 
 
 
Both FDI and portfolio investment have remained strong in Brazil which was one of the main 
FDI recipients in South America along with Chile and Colombia.  They together accounted for 
80% of the FDI inflows into Latin America with Brazil being the leading recipient of FDI in 
Latin America. The FDI flow to Brazil in 2008 was 30% higher than in 2007.   Total FDI inflows 
between January and October 2008 was US$ 34.7b (up from US$ 31b in 2007). Direct 
investment represented 2.6% of GDP between January and October 2008 (compared with 2.9% 
one year earlier). Most FDI in Brazil continued to be in the natural-resources sectors (ECLAC, 
2008a, p.3).  The relatively low volatility and high price of iron ore helped FDI flow to Brazil as 
it has large iron deposits. In 2008, Rio Tinto announced plans to expand for its La Corumba 
mine, and Anglo-American purchased the Brazilian firm Iron X (of the MMX group), Arcelor 
Mittal bought the assets of London Mining which has presence in Brazil, a Japan-Korea 
consortium of companies acquired a 40% stake in the mining arm of Compañía Siderúrgica 
Nacional (CSN) of Brazil.  Brazil also attracted significant investment in the bio-fuel sector from 
the UK, Portugal, France, and the US (ECLAC, 2008a, pp.37-38). 
 
However, it is also reported that Brazil‟s national economy has been affected negatively by the 
current global recession in a number of ways. These included: 
 
(i) The global crisis reduced the demand for basic products and this coupled with reduced 
access to credit, transnational corporations have cut back on their investment plans.  For 
example, Anglo-American announced a 50% cut in its expansion plans, which is likely to 
affect its projects in Brazil; 
 
(ii) The national currency which continued to appreciate until August 2008 (US$1 was 1.56 
Real – the lowest rate since 1999), despite the central bank‟s intervention in the foreign-
exchange market, it depreciated by about 50% in September 2008 ((US$1 was 2.44 Real) 
due to various reasons such as reduction in lines of credit for foreign trade, the 
withdrawal of foreign portfolio investors, remittances of the profits of transnational 
corporations‟ subsidiaries to their parent firms abroad, and Brazilian firms‟ need for 
foreign exchange to cover exchange-rate derivative transactions.  That is, in October 2008 
outflows of portfolio investment (shares and securities) reached US$ 7.8b and profit 
remittances between January and October amounted to US$ 30.5b, 67% more than in the 
same period of 2007; 
 
(iii) The shortage of external credit led to difficulties in interbank operations particularly 
affecting small and medium-sized banks, and this led to reduced longer-term loans for 
consumer durables and automobiles and made them costlier; 
  
(iv) A number of sectors have shown sign of problems created by the credit market. For 
example, the manufacturing sector contracted by 1.7% in October as compared with 
September 2008, as production of consumer durables and intermediate goods dropped by 
4.7% and 3%, respectively;  
 
(v) Automobile manufacturers (General Motors, Fiat, Scania and Volkswagen) decided to 
give their staff early vacations and suspend production for one or two weeks in order to 
avoid building up excess stock, after sales dropped by 11% in October 2008, which was 
expected to reduce the automobile production by about 200,000 units. Over all, it is 
expected that Brazil‟s automobiles production will drop by 20% in 2009. (ECLAC, 
2008a, FDI topic, p.49); 
 
(vi) The mining and iron and steel sectors also faced problems due to falling international 
prices for metals and minerals, with production cut announced by the leading firms;  
 
(vii) FDI position changed from net inflows of US$ 850m in the first 10 months of 
2007 to net outflows of US$ 15.6b in the same period of 2008. And foreign portfolio 
investment dropped from US$ 40.9b between January and October 2007 to just US$ 9.6b 
in the same period of 2008. This resulted in reduced the surplus balance of  payments in 
the capital and financial account of payments, that is, US$ 41.8b between January and 
October 2008, compared to US$ 77b recorded in the same period of 2007 (ECLAC, 2008, 
pp.86-87; 2008a, p.49); 
 
(viii) Between August and the end of November 2008, international cash reserves shrank 
by 5.4% to US$ 194b. But due US$ 30b received from the United States Federal 
Reserve for swap operations with the central bank of Brazil, the reserve stood at US$ 
235b; 
 
(ix) As in the other emerging regions, financial sector stress and deleveraging in advanced 
economies are raising borrowing costs and reducing capital inflows across Latin 
America which has affected Brazil as well;  
 
(x) Also, the decline in commodity prices has severely affected large economies in Latin 
America including Brazil which are world‟s major exporters of primary products;  
 
(xi) Brazil currency (Real) has depreciated significantly as it has flexible exchange rate 
regime. Local banks‟ funding costs have increased, particularly for small and medium 
size banks. The cost of external borrowing has also risen but remained relatively 
lower. Brazil has already taken steps to provide liquidity and support credit flows, 
especially to the corporate sector (IMF, 2009, p87); 
 
(xii) Overall, the current global financial crisis appears to have had some negative impacts 
on growth prospects for Brazil.  
According to Oxford Analytica (a consultancy in the UK), Brazil has been affected by the 
current global crisis in following ways: (i) reducing access to bank lending and capital markets 
(may be temporary); (ii)  delay or cancellation of infrastructure development projects (e.g. 1.9 
billion dollar port project in Peruibe, Sao Paulo, a 3.5 billion dollar high-tension power line from 
the Amazon to the edge of Sao Paulo); (iii) weakening of the national currency - the real (which 
lost 30% of its value between August and October in 2008, although it regained some ground 
later); (iv) a sharp fall in commodity prices affecting its export revenue; (v) slower economic 
growth (expected to be around 3.0% in 2009 from 4.5% in 2008) which means lower tax revenue 
and less funds for public works projects; (vi) companies felt the impact of global recession, as 
Brazil has 38 companies quoted on Wall Street (the largest number among Latin American 
nations) (Oxford Analytica, 2008). 
 
The government in Brazil has taken a number of policy measures to tackle the negative impact of 
the current global crisis.  These included: 
 
(i) the central bank lowered the reserve requirements for the large banks and used the large 
sums held in the form of compulsory deposits (259 b Real in August) to re inject almost 
85b Real into the financial system;  
(ii) credit for agriculture was increased by 6 b Real;  
(iii) It provided foreign exchange to the market, that is,  mainly swap contracts worth US$ 30 
b and direct sales of foreign exchange for US$ 6.7b; 
(iv) the central bank set up direct credit lines to the value of US$ 11.3b to finance exports; 
(v) the central bank was given far-reaching powers to intervene in the banking system and 
increased the scope and operations allowed to federal banks (such as Banco do Brasil and 
Caixa Econômica Federal); 
(vi) a number of production sectors received special credit lines to maintain the momentum 
of consumption; 
(vii) Monetary Policy Committee decided to suspend the rises in the basic interest rate 
lengthened the period for the monthly payment of taxes thus reducing pressure on 
companies‟ cash flows (ECLAC, 2008, p. 86).  
 
5. The Case of South Africa 
Like the case of Brazil, it is argued that South African economy will be able to overcome or 
minimise the negative impact of current global recession triggered by credit crunch in the US and 
Europe.  This argument is based on number of factors.  These included: (i) stability in the 
banking sector fostered by prudent regulatory regime by the South African Reserve Bank; (ii) the 
stability brought by exchange control regulations, which have ensured the banking sector‟s 
exposure is less risky in foreign markets; (iii) “The continued infrastructure development; (iv) 
reduction in interest rates; (v) significant economic growth (around 3% expected for 2008 and 
2009); (vi) recent decline in the value of national currency rand is expected to increase South 
Africa‟s exports, particularly from other emerging economies; (vii) increasing South-South trade 
relations (e.g. Brazil, India, Venezuela). 
It is argued that South Africa has been able to avoid serious negative impact of the current global 
recession, although the full impact is yet to take shape. However, like the case of Brazil, South 
Africa also has faced some problems because of the global recession.  These included: (i) 
affecting the domestic banking sector‟s ability to raise cash in international markets; (ii) affecting 
external financing of some key infrastructure projects; (iii) slow growth of the economy (which is 
already facing the impact of high inflation, and higher interest rate); (iv) declining exports to 
developed economies such as the US and EU (expected to decline from 7% in 2007 to 4% in 
2009); (v) dependence on commodity exports and its decline; (vi) declining foreign direct 
investment (FDI) delaying projects; and (vii) increasing net investment outflows as global 
investors pull out money due to elevated risk aversion (already felt in financial markets) 
(Donohoe, 2008).    
 
Table 5: South Africa: Key Economic Indicators – National Accounts 
Indicators 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
GNI Per Capita (US$) 3 280 3 150 3 050 2 830 2 640 2 870 3 630 4 820 5 390 -- 
Real GDP Growth Rates 
(%) 
0.5 2.4 4.2 2.7 3.7 3.1 4.9 5.0 5.4 4.9 
GDP at Current Market 
Prices (US$ billion) 
134.3 133.2 132.9 118.5 110.9 166.7 216.0 242.3 257.1 272.7 
General Government 
Final Consumption 
expenditure (US$ 
billion) 
25.2 24.5 24.1 21.6 20.4 32.2 41.8 47.2 50.0 55.2 
Household Final 
Consumption 
84.7 83.4 83.7 73.9 68.4 102.5 136.9 153.4 163.1 179.1 
expenditure (US$ 
billion) 
Gross Capital 
Formation (US$ 
billion) 
22.8 21.8 21.1 18.1 17.8 28.1 38.1 43.8 52.9 56.9 
Exports of Goods and 
Services (US$ 
billion) 
34.5 33.7 37.0 35.7 36.6 46.8 57.7 66.5 76.2 81.4 
Less Imports of 
Goods and Services 
(US$ billion) 
32.9 30.3 33.1 30.9 32.3 43.0 58.5 68.5 84.7 100.0 
Gross Domestic Savings 
(US$ billion) 
24.4 25.3 25.1 22.9 22.1 31.9 37.3 41.7 44.0 38.3 
GDP at Basic Prices 
(constant 2000 prices - 
US$ billion) 
124.6 127.6 132.9 136.5 141.5 145.9 153.0 160.7 169.3 177.7 
Agriculture 3.6 3.8 4.0 3.8 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.3 3.9 4.1 
Industry (US$ 
billion) 
36.6 36.5 38.4 39.1 40.2 40.5 42.3 44.2 46.3 48.6 
Manufacturing (US$ 
billion) 
21.1 21.2 22.9 23.7 24.3 24.0 25.1 26.3 27.6 29.0 
Services (US$ 
billion) 
72.5 75.4 78.4 81.3 84.7 88.5 93.1 98.0 104.0 109.0 
Source: African Development Bank (20008), Selected Statistics of African Countries-2008, Vol. 
XXVII, Tables 1 to 9, pp. 256-257, Tunis: Statistics Department, African Development Bank. 
 
 
Table 6: South Africa: Key Economic Indicators – Balance of Payments (US$ millions) 
Indicators 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Trade Balance  1 
818.3  
 
4 
002.1  
 
4 
707.8 
 
5 
183.8 
4 
777.9  
 
3 
527.2 
 
- 
191.3  
 
-1 
000.7 
 
-6 
201.3 
 
-7 
387.7 
 
Exports 29 
062.7  
 
28 
515.7  
 
32 
019.0  
 
30 
899.6  
 
31 
688.4  
 
38 
525.5  
 
48 
144.2  
 
55 
349.8  
 
64 
085.6  
 
69 
996.7 
 
Imports 27 
244.4  
 
24 
513.6 
 
27 
311.2  
 
25 
715.7  
 
26 
910.5  
 
34 
998.4  
 
48 
335.5  
 
56 
350.5  
 
70 
286.9  
 
77 
384.4 
 
Service - 
285.1  
 
- 
549.3  
 
- 
778.1  
 
- 
383.0  
 
- 
506.3  
 
265.3  
 
- 
654.4  
 
-1 
019.8 
 
-2 
309.1  
 
-3 
190.7 
 
Income -3 
161.5  
 
-3 
206.4 
 
-3 
175.6  
 
-3 
740.1  
 
-2 
795.6  
 
-4 
609.7  
 
-4 
317.9  
 
-4 
939.3 
 
-5 
273.0 
 
-4 
750.0 
 
Current 
Transfers 
- 
739.9  
- 
926.2 
- 
926.0  
- 
727.3  
- 
555.7  
- 
988.5  
-1 
756.0 
-2 
813.3 
-2 
786.7  
-3 
394.5 
          
Current 
Account 
Balance  
-2 
368.2  
 
- 
679.9  
 
- 
171.9  
 
333.5  
 
920.4  
 
-1 
805.8 
 
-6 
919.6  
 
-9 
773.0  
 
-16 
570.2 
 
-18 
722.9 
 
Capital & 
Financial 
Account 
3 
862.9  
 
1 
175.3 
 
- 
550.2  
 
-1 
309.5  
 
-1 
178.2  
 
-1 
231.8  
 
1 
332.0  
 
6 
404.8  
 
10 
660.2 
 
18 
495.2 
 
Source: African Development Bank (20008), Selected Statistics of African Countries-2008, Vol. 
XXVII, Tables 1 to 9, pp. 256-257, Tunis: Statistics Department, African Development Bank. 
 
 
Table 7: South Africa: Key Economic Indicators – External Debt and Financial Flows, Exchange 
& Interest Rates, Price Indices 
Indicators 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EXTERNAL DEBT AND FINANCIAL FLOWS (US$ million) 
Total External Public 
Debt 
10 
667.8 
8 
173.3 
9 
087.7  
7 
941.0  
12 
427.1  
14 
120.1  
 
13 
793.4  
 
15 
661.6  
 
13 
939.8 
 
International 
Organisations 
-- 31.2 144.7 121.9 128.8 211.5 262.7 314.5 341.7 
Private Lenders 10 
667.8 
8 
142.1 
8 
943.0 
7 
819.1 
12 
298.3 
13 
908.6 
13 
530.4 
15 
347.1 
13 
598.1 
Total Public Debt 
Service 
2 
654.4 
1 
043.9 
2 
173.3 
2 
558.1 
1 
695.6 
2 
064.8 
1 
434.5 
2 
414.9 
2 
617.1 
Debt Service/ Export of 
Goods and Service (%) 
18.0 17.9 13.8 14.8 12.8 12.7 10.6 8.3 8.4 
Net Total Financial 
Flows 
1 
663.6 
3 
693.3 
- 
493.3 
151.4 3 
000.1 
5 
427.0 
10 
236.1 
14 
782.0 
8 
304.0  
Net Direct Investment 
from DAC Countries+ 
1 
011.6 
2 
726.2 
397.0 329.2 1 
708.8 
3 
980.5 
8 
273.4 
12 
123.1 
2 
289.4  
Net official Development 
Assistance from all 
sources 
513.8 541.4 487.3 427.8 504.6 641.3 628.2 680.0 717.8 
International Reserves 5 391 7 373 7 534 7 472 7 639 7 971 14 720 20 630 25 587 
(32 
943 in 
2007) 
EXCHANGE & INTEREST RATES, PRICE INDICES 
Exchange Rate (National 
currency RAND/ US$ - 
end of period) 
5.86 6.15 7.57 12.13 8.64 6.64 5.63 6.33 6.97 
(6.81 
in 
2007) 
 
Exchange Rate (National 
currency RAND/ US$ - 
period average) 
5.53 6.11 6.94 8.61 10.54 7.56 6.46 6.36 6.77 
(7.05 
in 
2007) 
Inflation, Consumer 
Price (%) 
7.2 6.9 7.7 6.6 9.3 6.8 4.3 3.9 4.6 
(6.5 in 
2007) 
Consumer Price Index – 
All Items (2000 = 100) 
86.8 92.9 100.0 106.6 116.5 124.4 129.8 134.8 141.1 
(150.2 
 In 
2007) 
Source: African Development Bank (20008), Selected Statistics of African Countries-2008, Vol. XXVII, 
Tables 1 to 9, pp. 258-259, Tunis: Statistics Department, African Development Bank. 
 
+OECD‟s Development Assistance Committee members 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: South Africa: Key Economic Indicators – Production Indices 
Indicators 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Agriculture (1999-01 = 
100) 
91.5  96.5  104.5  99.0  105.0  103.6  105.4  110.9  106.1 
Food (1999-01 = 100) 94.1 97.6 104.8 97.6 102.8 100.4 101.3 105.8 100.7 
Mining (2000 = 100) 103.5 101.5 100.0 101.4 102.2 106.4 112.5 111.7 110.5 
Manufacturing (2000 = 
100) 
96.9 96.4 100.0 102.8 107.4 105.4 110.0 113.8 119.3 
          
Source: African Development Bank (20008), Selected Statistics of African Countries-2008, Vol. 
XXVII, Tables 1 to 9, pp. 256-257, Tunis: Statistics Department, African Development Bank. 
 
 
Table 5 shows that South Africa‟s economy has been growing steadily until 2006 and started 
slowing down in 2007 (GDP growth was 5.4% in 2006 and dropped to 4.9% in 2007). Exports 
have been steadily growing, but the imports have been growing much faster rate than exports.  
The growth of gross domestic savings dropped from US$44b in 2006 to US$38b in 2007. The 
service sector is the leading contributor to the economy (US$109b), that is more the joint 
contribution of  industry (US$48.6b), and manufacturing (US$29b).  That means the current 
global financial crisis is likely to have significant impact on South Africa due to the major 
importance of service sector to its economy. 
 
Table 6 clearly shows that South Africa has been facing negative trade balance since 2004 and it 
remains significant (US$7.4 in 2007).  The current account also has been in negative balance 
since 2003 and it remains significant (US$18.7 in 2007).   Table 7 shows that total external debt 
decreased from US$15.6 in 2005 to US$13.9b in 2006. But the RAND appreciated until 2006 
against the US$ affecting South Africa‟s exports and then it depreciated relatively.  The inflation 
has gone up from 4.6% 2006 to 6.5% in 2007.  Table 8 shows that South Africa did not see 
significant growth in its agriculture and food sector, but the manufacturing and mining sectors 
have been growing significantly. 
 
According the Economic Review of Africa – 2009, in South Africa, the financial sector has been 
affected as stock prices have declined dramatically and GDP growth declined significantly (from 
5.1 per cent in 2007 to 3.1 per cent in 2008) led by sharply lower growth in South Africa owing 
to a tightening in consumer spending and the slowdown in mining and quarrying. The tightening 
of global credit conditions is reducing FDI and reversing portfolio flows in South Africa and the 
financing of external deficits is expected to remain strained. According to IMF, South Africa‟s 
economy is projected to contract by about ¼% in 2009, its lowest growth rate in a decade, as 
capital outflows are forcing a sharp adjustment in asset prices (mainly in equity, bond, and 
currency markets) and in real activity.  South Africa‟s currency (Rand) has weakened by about 
23% against the US$ between September and November 2008 as a “flight to safety” triggered a 
sell-off in equities and bonds (Economic Commission for Africa, 2009, p.46; IMF, 2009, p.93; 
UN, 2009, pp.109-110). 
 
The global financial crunch appears to have affected even large African companies‟ ability to 
borrow on international markets. Also the domestic banking systems are also affected by 
liquidity shortage which makes it difficult for then to financing in the short term. This appears to 
have made an adverse impact on the private sector and on the value of stocks on the markets.   
Difficulties in financing investment projects appear to have forced firms to increase tariffs and 
prices. For example, Eskom, electricity supplier, has increased its tariffs as it is finding it 
difficult to raise finance for its long-term investment projects in international capital markets.  
 
Furthermore, the indirect effects of the current global recession and credit crunch are felt by 
African countries in general including South Africa in a number of areas. These included falling 
commodity prices and exports, slow and unpredictable capital inflows, and exchange rate 
volatility, adverse impact on non-traditional agriculture and tourism (Economic Commission for 
Africa, 2009, p.36). 
 
However, South Africa is not expected to witness serious problem in FDI.  For example, 
according to IMF because of high rate of return from sub-Saharan Africa the interest in investing 
in the region will continue (IMF, 2008, p.51). In fact, FDI in South Africa more than doubled in 
2008 to US12b from US$5.7b in 2007 (UN, 2009) 
 
 
5. The Case of China 
According to the Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2008, by the United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) China will remain 
resilient, as strong domestic demand is likely to neutralise partly the impact of global recession. 
The Survey found that not only in the case of China but also most other countries in the Asia-
Pacific region have strong macro-economic fundamentals (efficient fiscal and monetary policies, 
declining budget deficits, and even surpluses) which along with underlying regional domestic 
demand are likely to  overcome the global recession triggered by the US‟ downturn.  It is argued 
that firms in the Asia-Pacific economies including China are largely resilient to the credit crunch 
in the US and EU, as they are generally cash rich and not highly leveraged. For example, a report 
by Credit Suisse stated that “in China Internet, telecom and winery sectors are particularly top 
ranked, thanks to their low gearing or net cash positions, with their domestic customers facing 
limited credit tightening issues”(see Website B). The ESCAP survey also pointed to the fact that 
firms in these countries including China are more conservative as borrowers and also their 
central banks are also capable of meeting the liquidity demand by the financial sector. Indeed, 
the banks in the US and EU appear to be looking to Asian funds to build their depleted capital 
bases (ESCAP, 2008). For example, many global banks such as HSBC, GE Money and Standard 
Chartered are started looking towards emerging markets like China to offset the global losses 
(BBC, 06 August 2008). 
According to a report by Credit Suisse China is likely to be the least affected emerging market 
by the current credit crunch and global recession. Credit Suisse studied the impact of liquidity 
crunch on 216 companies in 59 sectors across 10 markets in the Asia Pacific region. It said that 
in Asia, except China, other markets are enduring a similar phenomenon as in the US because 
companies are facing difficulties in accessing funds (see Website B). 
However, like the case of Brazil and South Africa, it is opined that China is facing or likely to 
face some negative impact from the global recession.  For example, according to Sunil 
Poshakwale because of the developments in the US, stock markets in China have reacted 
negatively. They suffered mainly due to large scale withdrawal made by foreign institutional 
investors, mainly from the US, as they need cash in the US due to credit crunch in the US. But 
this appears to be happening in all merging markets and not just in China.  For example, nearly 
$26bn worth of outflows have occurred between June and August 2008 from the emerging 
market economies, compared to about $100bn that happened during the five years between 2002 
and 2007. Therefore, the stock markets are reacting negatively in these markets (Poshakwale, 
2008). 
Poshakwale also pointed out some other short term problems faced by China. He argued that 
unlike India, China has been much more proactive and taking risks by going out and investing. It 
had to do this to keep the exchange rate (particularly with reference to US$) at a competitive 
level. China has been buying US government bonds, treasury bills and bonds issued by 
investment banks. In fact, three banks in China have bought about $10.5bn worth of bonds and 
some of those bonds were issued by the Lehman Brothers which went bankrupt.  Because of 
such direct investments in the US, there is likely to be a direct impact on China. In the 
manufacturing sector particularly in Southern China, due to weakening global demand, there 
have been plant closures and layoffs. China‟s exports are suffering a bit because of the fall of the 
US dollar (Poshakwale, 2008).  
 
China‟s GDP growth has dropped from 11.4% in 2007 to 9.1% in 2008 and is expected to 
decline further to 8.4% in 2009 and also its current-account surplus dropped from 11.5% of GDP 
in 2007 to 8.5% of GDP in 2008. This is due to a number of reasons such as declining demand 
for Chinese exports in mainly in the developed economies, the appreciation of its national 
currency and rising labour costs.  China‟s exports to the US and EU amount to about 8% and 7% 
of GDP respectively, and therefore recession in these economies are likely to have significant 
Impact on China ((UN, 2009, p.116; Akyuz, 2008, p.38). But declining exports have actually led 
to increase in China‟s trade surplus  in 2008. This is due to sharp decline in imports of inputs that 
go into export products.  This is also due to reduced domestic demand. But in 2009, imports are 
expected to increase with the implementation of planned increase in infrastructure investment, 
which will stimulate demand for raw materials and machinery (Economic Commission for 
Africa, 2008). According to preliminary ESCAP forecasts of the impact of the recession, 
particularly the sharp economic slow down in the US, on China‟s growth in 2009 indicate that its 
exports will decline from 13.4% to 4.5% (ESCAP, 2008a, p.2). To face the potential adverse 
impacts of the global recession, in November 2008, China announced a fiscal stimulus package 
of $586b (14 per cent of GDP) to be implemented during 2009-10. Using this over two years it 
aims to stimulate domestic demand by reducing taxes, investing in public infrastructure, and 
promoting activities in the areas such as health care and education, agriculture, low-income 
housing, water, electricity, transportation, environment, technological innovation and rebuilding 
areas.  The stimulus package is also designed to boost the income of the poor through measures 
including higher subsidies and an increased government purchase price for grains in 2009. 
Despite this, growth forecasts for China suggest that it will drop to have been 7-8% in 2009 (UN, 
2009, p.116; Economic Commission for Africa, 2008). 
 
 
Table 9: China: Key Economic Indicators (excluding Hong Kong and Macao) 
Indicators 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
* 
Real GDP Growth Rates 
(%) 
7.6 8.4 8.3 9.1 10.0 10.1 10.4 11.6 13.0 9.0 
Gross Domestic Savings 
Rates (% of GDP) 
38.0 38.0 39.0 40.4 43.0 45.6 47.3 47.8 48.6 49.9 
Gross Domestic 
Investment Rates (% of 
GDP) 
36.7 35.1 36.3 37.9 41.2 43.3 43.3 44.5 44.2 41.8 
Inflation Rates (%) -1.4 0.4 0.5 -0.8 1.2 3.9 1.8 1.5 4.8 5.9 
Budget Balance (% of 
GDP) 
-3.0 -2.8 -2.5 -2.6 -2.2 -1.3 -1.2 -0.8 0.7 0.4 
Current Account Balance  
(% of GDP) 
1.9 1.7 1.3 2.4 2.8 3.5 7.0 9.1 11.5 10.2 
Change in Money 
Supply (%) 
14.7 12.3 15.0 13.1 19.2 14.9 16.7 22.1 16.7 14.0 
Merchandise Export 
Growth Rates (%) 
6.1 27.9 6.7 22.4 34.6 35.4 28.4 27.2 25.7 17.3 
Merchandise Import 
Growth Rates (%) 
18.2 24.4 12.6 27.1 39.9 36.0 17.6 19.9 20.7 18.4 
Source: ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Tables 1 to 9, pp. 174-182, 
New York: United Nations. 
* Either estimated figure or for only part of the year 
 
But it is expected to be a short term problem rather than a long-term trend. Because, even within 
domestic market China has significant potential for growth as demands remain strong.  For 
example, retail sales in China have been growing by 20% a year (BBC, 06 August 2008). It is 
further argued that by itself the current credit crunch may not seriously affect the economic 
growth in China and it may reduce the growth rate by a couple of percentage points. However, 
serious external problems such as sudden stop of capital flows and contraction of export markets 
are expected to have severe impact on China‟s growth rate. 
 
Table 9 shows that GDP growth in China has dropped from 13% in 2007 to over 9% in 2008.  
The gross domestic savings have grown significantly until 2007 and dropped slightly in 2008, 
but it is still significant (i.e. about 50% of GDP).  Inflation has increased by 1% in 2008, but 
budget balance and current account balance are significant compared to other case countries. But 
the export growth has dropped significantly in 2008, but imports remained strong (dropped only 
slightly) in 2008.  Table 10 shows that the FDI inflow remained very significant over the years 
(2.5% of GDP in 2007) and it was nearly four times that of India. 
 
 
Table 10: Inward Foreign Direct investment: China and India 
Country FDI Inward Stock FDI Net Inflows 
US$ in 
millions 
% of GDP US$ in 
millions 
% of GDP 
2007 1990-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
2007 2007 1990-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
2007 
China 327,087 9.7 16.0 13.5 9.6 83,521 3.6 4.1 3.3 2.5 
India 76,226 0.9 3.0 5.2 6.7 22,950 0.2 0.7 0.9 2.0 
Source: ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Tables 10 p. 183, New 
York: United Nations. 
 
 
One of the reasons for China not being affected seriously by the financial crisis in the US and EU 
is the nature of banking and financial system in China.  The government control over the 
financial system has been much stronger.  For example, the reserve requirements of banks were 
constantly raised from 7% in 2003 to 15% in 2008 and banks are holding over 80% of central 
bank securities issued for that purpose (Akyuz, 2008, p.21).  China was able to provide fiscal 
support because of its reserve stockpiles, more credible inflation-targeting regimes, and stronger 
public balance sheets. 
 
Although the emerging economies in general have been affected by the global recession and saw 
their growth reduced by the end of 2008, China did not see such decline mainly because of lower 
shares of their export sectors in domestic production and more resilient domestic demand. 
China‟s policy measures have supported domestic activity and the first quarter of 2009 has 
shown some signs of a turnaround in economic activity (IMF, 2009, pp.4-5, p.71).  
 
Another factor that helps China to minimize the impact of global recession is the nature outward 
investment by residents. Unlike Indian firms which acquired assets abroad funded by capital 
inflows, China‟s companies acquired assets abroad by foreign exchange earnings from trade 
surpluses.  That is, their acquisition of assets abroad has been based on their success of 
competition in international markets (Akyuz, 2008, pp.27-28). 
 
Although the Chinese national currency renminbi (RMB) that is pegged to the dollar have also 
appreciated in real effective terms, it has remained broadly unchanged relative to the dollar.   
While other leading exporters such as Japan have experienced sharp decline in demand for 
manufacturing exports, China is expected to witness significant economic growth (though less 
than recent years,) with increasing domestic demand (IMF, 2009, p.16 and 71).  Although the 
growth in China is expected to slow to about 6.5% in 2009 (i.e. half the 13% growth rate 
recorded pre-crisis in 2007), it is still considered a strong performance in the current global 
recession conditions. IMF has identified two factors for this. First, although the exports declined 
significantly, it‟s impact is not severe as they have a smaller share of the economy, particularly 
after factoring in its high import content. Second, the government has acted aggressively with 
policy measures to stimulate it domestic market with the aim of helping to boost consumption 
(IMF, 2009, p.72).  
 
6. The Case of India 
 
Tables 11 to 17 below provide main economic indicators for India. Table 11shows that GDP 
growth rate has dropped from 9% in 2007 to 7% in 2008, which is still significant.  The domestic 
savings (% of GDP) have been growing steadily over the years but dropped slightly in 2008.  The 
inflation has increased from 4.4% in 2005 to 9% in 2008, budget deficit (%GDP) has gone up to 
6% again after being under control in the past few years.  The export growth has declined 
significantly from 2007 to 2008 (from 23% to 11%) and imports growth has declined since 2004. 
 
 
Table 11: India: Main Economic Indicators 
Indicators 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
* 
Real GDP Growth Rates 
(%) 
6.4 4.4 5.8 3.8 8.5 7.5 9.4 9.6 9.0 7.1 
Gross Domestic Savings 
Rates (% of GDP) 
24.8 23.7 23.5 26.4 29.8 31.8 34.3 34.8 35.5 34.5 
Gross Domestic 
Investment Rates (% of 
GDP) 
25.9 24.3 22.8 25.2 28.2 32.2 35.5 35.9 37.0 37.7 
Inflation Rates (%) 4.7 4.0 3.8 4.3 3.8 3.8 4.4 6.7 6.2 9.0 
Budget Balance (% of 
GDP) 
-5.4 -5.7 -6.2 -5.9 -4.5 -4.0 -4.1 -3.4 -2.7 -6.0 
Current Account Balance  
(% of GDP) 
-1.0 -0.6 0.7 1.3 2.4 -0.4 -1.2 -1.1 -1.5 -2.7 
Change in Money 
Supply (%) 
17.1 15.2 14.3 16.8 13.0 16.7 15.6 21.6 22.3 23.6 
Merchandise Export 
Growth Rates (%) 
9.5 21.1 1.5 20.3 23.3 28.5 23.4 21.8 23.7 11.5 
Merchandise Import 
Growth Rates (%) 
16.5 4.6 12.3 14.5 24.1 48.6 33.8 21.8 29.9 19.0 
Source: ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Tables 1 to 9, pp. 174-182, 
New York: United Nations. 
* Either estimated figure or for only part of the year 
 
 
Table 12: India: Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost by Industry of Origin  
(At 1990-2000 Prices in Rupees-billion) 
Year 
(1) 
Agriculture, 
Forestry & 
Fishing, 
Mining, and 
Quarrying 
(2) 
Manufacturing, 
Construction, 
Electricity, 
Gas and Water 
supply (3) 
Trade, Hotels, 
Transport and 
Communications 
(4) 
Financing, 
Insurance, 
Real 
Estate, and 
Business 
Services (5) 
Public 
Administration 
& Defence 
and Other 
services (6) 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
at Factor 
Cost (2 – 
6) 
1999-
2000 
4881.09 4106.46 3875.14 2335.50 2667.07 17865.25 
2000-01 4879.92 4383.72 4156.50 2430.48 2792.39 18643.00 
2001-02 5165.84 4507.23 4538.47 2607.37 2907.15 19726.06 
2002-03 4861.34 4817.58 4966.92 2815.50 3021.53 20482.87 
2003-04 5313.02 5193.22 5563.70 2972.50 3185.14 22227.58 
2004-05 5350.37 5740.77 6158.48 3230.80 3403.42 23883.84 
2005-06 
(P) 
5661.63 6351.21 6867.38 3599.42 3648.83 26128.47 
2006-
07(Q) 
5885.30 7078.45 7678.84 4100.30 3900.20 28643.09 
Source: Ministry of Finance (Government of India), Economic Survey 2007-2008, from Table 1.3A, p. 
A5. 
P – Provisional Estimates 
Q – Quick Estimates; US$1 =  About Rs 40-45 
 
 
Tables12 shows the distribution of the shares of different sectors in the national economy.  The 
three sectors – Trade, transport and communications sector, manufacturing, and financial sector 
have been making bigger contributions in that order. Any impact from the current global 
financial crisis on these sectors is likely to have an impact on the national economy in India.  
Table 13 shows that all the sectors have been growing steadily until 2007, except the agriculture 
sector which has seen fluctuating growth which is not surprising due to its reliance on monsoon 
and natural factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: India: Annual Growth Rates of Real Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost by 
Industry of Origin (At 1990-2000 Prices) 
Year 
(1) 
Agriculture, 
Forestry & 
Fishing, 
Mining, and 
Quarrying 
(2) 
Manufacturing, 
Construction, 
Electricity, 
Gas and Water 
supply (3) 
Trade, Hotels, 
Transport and 
Communications 
(4) 
Financing, 
Insurance, 
Real 
Estate, and 
Business 
Services (5) 
Public 
Administration 
& Defence 
and Other 
services (6) 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
at Factor 
Cost (2 – 
6) 
2000-01 0.0 6.8 7.3 4.1 4.7 4.4 
2001-02 5.9 2.8 9.2 7.3 4.1 5.8 
2002-03 -5.9 6.9 9.4 8.0 3.9 3.8 
2003-04 9.3 7.8 12.0 5.6 5.4 8.5 
2004-05 0.7 10.5 10.7 8.7 6.9 7.5 
2005-06 
(P) 
5.8 10.6 11.5 11.4 7.2 9.4 
2006-
07(Q) 
4.0 11.5 11.8 13.9 6.9 9.6 
Source: Ministry of Finance (Government of India), Economic Survey 2007-2008, from Table 1.4, 
p.A7. 
P – Provisional Estimates 
Q – Quick Estimates 
 
Table 14: India: Exports, Imports and Trade Balance (in US$ millions) 
Year 
 
Exports 
(Including 
Re-exports) 
Imports Trade 
Balance 
Exports – 
rate of 
Change (%) 
Imports 
(Rate of 
Change (%) 
2000-01 44560 50536 -5976 21.0 1.7 
2001-02 43827 52413 -7586 -1.6 1.7 
2002-03 52719 61412 -8693 20.3 19.4 
2003-04 63843 78150 -14307 21.1 27.3 
2004-05 83535 111516 -27982 30.8 42.7 
2005-06 103092 149167 -46076 23.4 33.8 
2006-07 126360 185747 -59387 22.6 24.5 
2007-08 (P) 110965 168803 -57839 21.6 25.9 
Source: Ministry of Finance (Government of India), Economic Survey 2007-2008, from 
Table 7.1B, p. A81. 
P – Provisional 
 
 
Table 15: India: Principal Exports (in US$ millions) 
Export Items 2000-01 2005-06 2006-07 2007 (Apr-
Sep) 
Agricultural and Allied 
Products 
6256 10549 13030 6690 
Ores and Minerals  
(Excluding Coal) 
906 5361 6036 2934 
Manufactured Goods 35181 74200 86729 48442 
Mineral Fuels and 
Lubricants (Including 
Coal) 
1931 11867 18904 1286 
TOTAL EXPORTS 44560 103092 126360 71910 
Source: Ministry of Finance (Government of India), Economic Survey 2007-2008, from 
Table 7.3A, pp. A87-A88. 
 
Table 14 shows that India has experienced constantly a negative trade balance due to greater 
growth in imports compared to exports particularly since 2003-04.  Table 15 shows clearly that 
manufacturing goods were the leading exports from India and mineral fuels and lubricants also 
formed significant part of total exports. 
 
Table 16 clearly shows that the share of exports to EU and North America is very significant 
(39% and 16% respectively in 2007-08), while India‟s leading export regions are in Asia (nearly 
50%), and its exports to the rest of the world makes up for about 10%.  Table 16 highlights the 
share of India‟s exports to selected countries in different regions.  This shows that the leading 
export market for India is the US (15%).  This is followed by UAE (9.5%), China (6.6%), 
Singapore (4.8%), the UK (4.2%), Hong Kong (3.7%) and Germany (3.2%).  These figures 
suggest that the financial crisis and current economic slow down in EU and the US could have 
significant negative impact on India‟s exports.  
 
 
Table 16: India: Exports by Regions (US$ million) and Share % 
Regions 2005-06 2006-07 Share % 2007-08  
Apr-Sep 
Share % 
Europe 24910.3 28922.3 22.9 16543.9 23.0 
Africa 
(excluding 
North Africa) 
5441.7 8400.5 6.7 5533.8 7.7 
North 
America 
18374.6 20026.0 15.9 10443.6 14.5 
Latin 
America 
2993.5 4274.9 3.4 2354.7 3.3 
East Asia  1004.5 1489.7 1.2 617.7 0.9 
ASEAN 10411.3 12563.7 10.0 6445.4 9.0 
West Asia 
and North 
Africa 
16685.2 23020.4 18.2 14548.6 20.2 
North East 
Asia 
16226.1 19336.2 15.3 10629.8 14.8 
South Asia 5547.7 6471.4 5.1 3677.1 5.1 
CIS  1247.6 1483.0 1.2 740.3 1.0 
TOTAL 103090.5 126331.1 100.0 71909.6 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Finance (Government of India), Economic Survey 2007-2008, from 
Table 7.4B, pp. A95-99. 
 
 
Table 17: India: Exports by Ranking of Selected Countries in Different Regions 
(US$ million) and Share % 
Regions 2006-07 Share % Regions 2006-07 Share % 
Europe ASEAN 
1. UK  5547.2 4.2 1. Singapore 6021.1 4.8 
2.Germany 3987.5 3.2 2. Indonesia 2027.3 1.6 
3. Italy 3692.0 2.9 3. Thailand 1443 1.1 
4. Belgium 3473.4 2.8 4. Malaysia 1304.8 1.0 
5. Netherland 2668.9 2.1 North East Asia   
6. France 2115.1 1.7 1. China PR 37514.9 6.6 
Africa (excluding North Africa) 2.Hong Kong 21195.5 3.7 
1. South Africa 2246.3 1.8 3.Japan 12727.9 2.2 
North America   4. Korea RP 11427.0 2.0 
1. US 18872.0 14.9 West Asia and North Africa 
Latin America 1.UAE 12014.7 9.5 
1.Brazil 1477.6 1.2 2.Saudi Arabia 2582.8 2.0 
East Asia  South Asia 
1.Australia 924.6 0.7 1. Sri Lanka 10199.7 1.8 
   2. Bangladesh 7369.2 1.3 
Source: Ministry of Finance (Government of India), Economic Survey 2007-2008, from Table 
7.4B, pp. A95-99. 
 
 
Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2008, by the United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) suggested that in emerging Asia, India will 
feel the least impact from the global recession and credit crunch.  
Makarand Teje argued that India will be able to minimise the negative impact of the global 
recession due to number of factors.  These included: (i) India  is one of the strongest economies 
in the world as the second fastest growing economy behind China (12th largest globally); (ii) It 
has enjoyed very high economic growth in the last eight years and is unlikely to see big drop in 
this growth; (iii) It has  taken measures to minimise the effects caused by the global recession; 
(iv) it is in a relatively stable position; (v) in recent years, the Indian corporate sector 
(particularly the technology and services firms) was involved in mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) in the US and EU, but they have avoided companies in trouble and highly leveraged 
transactions and funded these deals with bank loans and higher grade credit, which has helped 
them to steer clear of the credit crunch (Teje, 2008); (vi) India continues to attract investors 
(e.g. the recent acquisitions from NTT DoCoMo (buying 26% of Tata Teleservices 
for $2.7 billion) and Telenor (buying 60% of Unitech Wireless for $1.1 billion) (see 
Website C); (vii) many global banks such as HSBC, GE Money and Standard Chartered are 
turning towards India and China to offset the global losses (BBC, 06 August 2008), and (viii) 
unlike in China, the banks in India do not have high exposure to the US bonds ( not more than 
$5mn) (Poshakwale, 2008).  
Although India was expected to escape with little or no negative impact from the global credit 
crunch, it is clear that India is facing some problems, may be short-term.  It has been affected by 
three main factors - the impact of the global credit crunch, high oil prices and rising inflation 
driven by high cost of fuel and food. This forced the Reserve Bank of India to increase interest 
rate. It is felt that higher interest rates could lead to declining economic growth.  
According to a report by Credit Suisse in India, despite the unprecedented easing and cash 
reserve ratio reduction, domestic liquidity has not really eased significantly. Particularly, the 
credit crunch is exerting pressure on the Indian real estate, banks, construction and metals 
sectors.  It appears that real estate companies are sacrificing growth to generate liquidity. Also, 
the liquidity problem does not mean just availability of money, the banks are unwilling to lend. 
The sectors such as sugar, auto, engineering, IT services, telecom and pharmaceuticals have also 
been affected by the liquidity crunch (See Website B). 
The negative impact of global recession on India included: (i) manufacturers have seen slump in 
profits; (ii) consumers are not spending enough; (iii) financial markets witnessed big slump (the 
Bombay Stock Exchange's benchmark Sensex has fallen more than 5,000 points); (iv) financial 
institutions have reduced the level of consumer finance such as lending to buy a new car or a 
new home (BBC, 06 August 2008). The Reserve Bank of India has repeatedly increased the cash 
reserve ratio (the level of minimum cash banks must keep in relation to customer deposits) to 
discourage lending; (v) India is affected by difficult external financing for firms and banks and 
also, unlike China, India has less room to ease macroeconomic policies. According to IMF, due 
to weaker investment, difficult financing conditions and problems in domestic credit market, 
India‟s growth is expected to decline from over 9% in 2007 to 4.5% in 2009 (IMF, 2009,p.73). 
But it is argued that the global credit crunch may have some impact on economic growth, but not 
serious negative impact.  According to ESCAP forecasts of the impact of the United States 
recession on merchandise exports from India in 2009, it is expected to decline from 9.9 to 2.6 
percent (ESCAP, 2008a).  It is also expected that India‟s  current account deficits is likely to rise 
from its recent levels of 3% to 5% of GDP as exports slow down and growth of income and 
imports is sustained. Although India‟s relatively high levels of reserves would help ease this 
problem, it is likely to face serious situation if it faces a sudden stop or reversal of capital flows 
(Yukuz, 2008, 45).  
The foreign-exchange reserves fell by more than $17b in first half of October 2008 alone, partly 
due to foreign capital outflows. India‟s economic activity, which had been growing at 9% or 
more over the past few years, has been faltering in response to the global recession and financial 
crisis in the US and EU, and also due to hardening of commodity prices in international markets.  
Also, the inflation rose from 6.4% in 2007 to 8% in 2008 (UN, 2009, p117) 
 
Although India has been affected by contraction in the export sector, India, like China, it is less 
exposed to the decline in global demand and its economy has continued to grow because trade is 
a smaller share of the economy and policy measures have supported domestic activity (IMF, 
2009,pp.71-73).  To ease the problems in the money market and foreign exchange liquidity 
shortages, India introduced policy measures by cutting rate and reserve requirements, with large 
liquidity injections and relaxing controls on capital inflows and introducing foreign exchange 
swaps for banks.  
 
7. Analysis of the Cases 
 
In this section we compare some important data across the case countries and then also provide 
Tables which links specific country data with the 6 sets of NSI elements identified in the 
conceptual framework.  By this we try to show how analysing all 6 sets of NSI related data could 
identify the potential mitigating capability of an individual NSI and help draw some general 
conclusions. 
 
Table 18 shows that China is in far better position among the case countries in terms of current 
account balance (% GDP), external debt refinancing needs and South Africa is in unfavourable 
position in these areas among the 4 case countries. 
 
 
Tables 18: Comparison of Macro and Financial Indicators among Case Countries 
Country Current 
Account 
Balance (% 
of GDP) 
External Debt 
Refinancing 
Needs in 2009 
(% of 
Reserves) 
Net External 
Position vis-à-
vis BIS 
Reporting Banks 
(% of GDP) 
Average Real 
Credit Growth 
over the Last 
Five Years (% 
year-on-year) 
Loan/ 
Deposit 
(Ratio) 
Brazil -1.8 40 -7.1 15.9 0.8 
South 
Africa 
-5.8 49 4.4 12.8 1.2 
China 10.3 14 0.7 11.3 0.8 
India -2.5 33 -8.9 18.2 0.8 
Source: IMF (2009), Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the Financial Crisis and 
Measuring Systematic Risk, April, Washington D.C: IMF, Table 1.1, p. 13. 
 
BIS – Bank for International Settlements 
 
 
Table 19: Comparison of Equity Market Indices among Case Countries 
Country End of 
2006 
End of 
2007 
End of 
2008 
End of 
2006 
(% 
Change) 
End of 
2007 
(% 
Change) 
End of 
2008 
(% 
Change) 
12-
Month 
High 
12-
Month 
Low 
Emerging 
Markets 
912.7 1245.6 567.0 29.2 36.5 -54.5 1249.7 454.3 
Brazil 2205.4 3867.2 1638.2 40.5 75.3 -57.6 4727.6 1286.5 
South 
Africa 
443.1 508.3 305.1 17.3 14.7 -40.0 523.2 204.4 
China 52.1 84.9 40.8 78.1 63.1 -51.9 84.9 27.2 
India 390.6 668.9 233.6 49.0 71.2 -65.1 694.2 198.1 
Source: IMF (2009), Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the Financial Crisis and 
Measuring Systematic Risk, April, Washington D.C: IMF, Table 10, pp. 187-88. 
 
 
Table 19 clearly shows that equity market indices in all case countries and the emerging markets 
have declined significantly and by the end of 2008 both India and Brazil have witnessed big drop, 
followed by China.  South Africa has experienced relatively low drop in this are.  It appears that 
the current global economic crisis has affected these markets. 
 
Table 20 again shows that the foreign exchange rate for national currencies of the case countries 
have experienced significant appreciation against the US$ in 2007 and subsequently depreciated 
significantly in 2008, except the case China. 
  
Table 20: Comparison of Foreign Exchange Rate among Case Countries (Units per US$) 
Country End of 
2003 
End of 
2004 
End of 
2005 
End of 
2006 
 
End of 
2007 
 
End of 
2008 
12-
Month 
High 
12-
Month 
Low 
Brazil 2.89 2.66 2.34 2.14 1.78 2.31 1.56 2.51 
South 
Africa 
6.68 5.67 6.33 7.01 6.86 9.53 6.74 11.57 
China 8.28 8.28 8.07 7.81 7.30 6.83 6.81 7.30 
India 45.63 43.46 45.05 44.26 39.42 48.80 39.27 50.29 
Source: IMF (2009), Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the Financial Crisis and 
Measuring Systematic Risk, April, Washington D.C: IMF, Table 11, p. 190. 
 
 
 
Table 21: Comparison of External Financing – Total Bonds, Equities, and Loans 
among Case Countries
*
 (In US$ million) 
Country 2004  2005 2006 2007 
 
2008 
 
Total Emerging 
Markets 
325 729.6 454 640.3 540 183.9 716 401.2 446 540.0 
Brazil 16 669.8 27 486.0 31 219.4 72 969.1 30 343.1 
South Africa 5 324.8 6 265.9 12 700.7 19 797.5 2 799.5 
China 25 661.6 38 804.6 50 039.4 74 700.7 29, 053.1 
India 13 301.1 21 660.0 29 534.4 58 005.3 37 206.4 
Source: IMF (2009), Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the Financial Crisis 
and Measuring Systematic Risk, April, Washington D.C: IMF, Table 14, pp. 196-97. 
* External public syndicated issuance, excluding bilateral deals 
 
 
Table 21 again shows clearly that all case countries have witnessed significant drop in external 
financing (total bonds, equities, and loans) in 2008.  Until 2007 they all have seen a steady 
growth in external financing. 
 
Table 22 highlights investments in R&D and education and skills development in the case 
countries.  It suggests that all these countries have been consistently investing about 0.8 to 0.9% 
of GDP in R&D.  They also have been making significant investment in education.  These are 
summarised in the following tables (23 to 26). 
 
Table 22: Expenditure on Education and R&D in Case Countries 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
R&D as % of GDP  
Brazil 0.94 0.96 0.91 0.88 0.83 0.82 -- 
South Africa -- 0.73 -- 0.80 0.86 0.92 -- 
China 8.6 9.8 10.1 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.2 
India 0.77 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.69 -- -- 
Total gross domestic expenditure on R&D by source of funds (%) – Business 
Enterprises 
 
Brazil 40.0 39.1 40.3 39.2 39.9 39.4 -- 
South Africa -- 53.3 -- 52.1 44.5 43.9 -- 
China 57.6 -- -- 60.1 65.7 67.0 69.1 
India 18.0 19.3 20.3 20.0 19.8 -- -- 
Total gross domestic expenditure on R&D by source of funds (%) – 
Government 
 
Brazil 58.7 59.4 57.9 58.7 57.9 58.3 -- 
South Africa -- 35.2 -- 27.9 23.7 38.2 -- 
China 33.4 -- -- 29.9 26.6 26.3 24.7 
India 77.9 76.5 75.6 75.4 75.3 -- -- 
Total gross domestic expenditure on R&D by source of funds (%) – Higher 
Education 
 
Brazil 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.3 -- 
South Africa -- -- -- 3.5 9.2 3.0  
China -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
India 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.5 4.9 -- -- 
Public Expenditure on Education as % of GDP 
Brazil 4.0 -- -- -- -- 4.0 -- 
South Africa 5.6 -- -- -- -- 5.3  
China 1.9 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
India 4.4 -- -- -- -- 3.2 -- 
Public Expenditure on Education as % of Total Government Expenditure 
Brazil 12.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
South Africa 18.1 -- -- -- -- 17.9  
China 13.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
India 12.7 -- -- -- -- 10.7 -- 
Total Enrolment (000’s) – Primary to Tertiary Education 
Brazil 49 090 -- -- -- -- 48097 -- 
South Africa 12 384 -- -- -- -- --  
China -- -- -- -- -- 233 702 -- 
India 194 430 -- -- -- -- 244 116 -- 
Source: UNESCO Statistics on Research and Development, and Education  
(see http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx) 
 
  
Table 23: Some Major Components of NSI that Could have Mitigating Impact on Recession - 
Brazil 
Components of NSI  Nature/ Level of Presence in National Economy of Brazil 
1. The general investment climate 
and economic policy framework:  
(a)Macroeconomic and social 
stability 
(b) National fiscal policy regime 
(c) Foreign debt 
(d) Inflation 
(e) Interest rate and  
(f) Regulatory regime such as trade 
and tax policies 
(g) Nature and role of FDI  
 
(a) Relatively stable GDP growth  
(b) Significant cash reserves, low current account balance 
(1.8%GDP) 
(c) Significant foreign debt, but reduced in recent years 
(d)  
(e)Low interest rate (suspended)/ Real depreciated 
significantly 
(f) Regulatory regime responding to present crisis with 
number of initiatives 
(g) High inflow (30% of total inflow to Latin America), 
mainly in natural resources sector 
2. Market, per capita income,  
domestic savings:  
(a) Domestic market size / structure 
(b) Links to regional and global 
markets 
(c) Domestic savings 
Growth 
 
(a) Significant domestic market, steady growth of per capita 
GDP 
(b) good access to Latin American markets 
(c)Significant (US$232b in 2007) 
3. Industrial structure:  
(a) Presence of diverse industrial 
structure  
(b) Strength of domestic firms 
(c) Presence and role of foreign 
firms 
(d) Links to foreign companies/ 
foreign financial market 
 
(a) Significantly diversified sectors (strong manufacturing, 
natural resources, and agriculture sectors) 
(b) Strong domestic firms, carry less debt loads compared to 
foreign firms 
(c)36 companies are listed in Wall street (US) 
4. Financial Institutions: 
(a) Banking sector 
(b) Role and effectiveness of the 
Central Bank 
(c) Links to foreign financial market 
 
(a) Dominated by small number of banks 
(b) More powers given to central bank after global crisis 
(c) Significant links to foreign financial market, number of 
projects depends on it. 
5. Foreign Trade: 
(a) Nature of exports 
(b) Export markets (Destinations) 
(c) Dependence on commodity 
exports 
 
 
(a) Manufacturing/ agriculture goods 
(b) Same levels of exports and imports by 2007 
(c) Significant dependence on commodity exports, fall in 
commodity prices affected the economy. 
6. Skills, R&D, and Technology 
development: 
(a) Investment in education and 
 
(a) Investment in education and skills have been over 4% of 
GDP consistently. 
skills (human resources) 
development 
(b) Investment in R&D 
(b) Investment in R&D has been between 0.8 to 0.9% of GDP 
(about 40% by Business enterprises and 58% by the 
government) 
 
 
 
Table 24: Some Major Components of NSI that Could have Mitigating Impact on Recession – 
South Africa 
Components of NSI  Nature/ Level of Presence in National Economy of Brazil 
1. The general investment climate 
and economic policy framework:  
(a)Macroeconomic and social 
stability 
(b) National fiscal policy regime 
(c) Foreign debt 
(d) Inflation 
(e) Interest rate and  
(f) Regulatory regime such as trade 
and tax policies 
(g) Nature and role of FDI  
 
(a) Relatively significant GDP growth (3%) despite the global 
recession  
(b) Current account balance –US$18b. 
(c) Significant foreign debt (US$14b in 2006). 
(d) Inflation increased from 4.6% in 2006 to 6.5 in 2007 
(e) Reduced interest rate / RAND depreciated significantly 
(23% in late 2008) 
(f) Generally prudent regulatory regime; responded to present 
crisis with number of initiatives 
(g) Declining FDI and increasing net outflow of funds (FDI 
mainly in natural resources sector) 
2. Market, per capita income,  
domestic savings:  
(a) Domestic market size / structure 
(b) Links to regional and global 
markets 
(c) Domestic savings Growth 
 
(a) Small domestic market than other cases, significant growth 
of per capita GDP in recent years 
(b) Close access to African markets, strong links to EU and 
America, increasing South-South links 
(c) Relatively small savings growth compared to other cases 
(US$38b in 2007) 
3. Industrial structure:  
(a) Presence of diverse industrial 
structure  
(b) Strength of domestic firms 
(c) Presence and role of foreign 
firms 
(d) Links to foreign companies/ 
foreign financial market 
 
(a) Significantly diversified sectors with services leading 
(significant growth in manufacturing and mining, but no 
growth in agriculture and food sectors) 
(b) Strong domestic firms and stock prices fell significantly 
because of current financial crisis. 
(c) significant presence of foreign firms 
(d) Strong links to foreign financial market for financing 
4. Financial Institutions: 
(a) Banking sector 
(b) Role and effectiveness of the 
Central Bank 
(c) Links to foreign financial market 
 
(a) Stable banking sector with prudent policy regime, but 
domestic banking affected by liquidity problems due to 
current crisis. 
(b) Strong central bank 
(c) Significant links to foreign financial market, but with less 
risks in foreign market due to prudent policy regime. 
5. Foreign Trade: 
(a) Nature of exports 
(b) Export markets (Destinations) 
 
(a) Exports less than imports leading to negative trade balance 
(US$18.7 in 2007) 
(c) Dependence on commodity 
exports 
 
(b) Main markets are EU, the US, rest of Africa, now 
increasing South-South trade. 
(c) Significant dependence on commodity exports, fall in 
commodity prices affected the economy. 
6. Skills, R&D, and Technology 
development: 
(a) Investment in education and 
skills (human resources) 
development 
(b) Investment in R&D 
(a) Investment in education and skills have been over 5% of 
GDP 
(b) Investment in R&D has increased from 0.73 in 2000 to 
0.92 in 2005(about 43% by Business enterprises and 38% by 
the government) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 25: Some Major Components of NSI that Could have Mitigating Impact on Recession – 
China 
Components of NSI  Nature/ Level of Presence in National Economy of Brazil 
1. The general investment climate 
and economic policy framework:  
(a)Macroeconomic and social 
stability 
(b) National fiscal policy regime 
(c) Foreign debt 
(d) Inflation 
(e) Interest rate and  
(f) Regulatory regime such as trade 
and tax policies 
(g) Nature and role of FDI  
 
(a) More stronger than other case countries. Although GDP 
growth declined from 11.4 % in 2007 to 9% in 2008, it is still 
high despite the global recession  
(b) Current account balance is significant (about 11% of 
GDP). 
(c) External financing (total bonds, equities, and loans) 
amounted to US$30b in 2008. 
(d) Inflation increased from 4.8% in 2007 to 5.9 in 2008 
(e) Reduced interest rate / RMB appreciated significantly 
despite global crisis. 
(f) Strong government control and regulatory regime; 
responded to present crisis with big stimulation package 
(US$586b) 
(g) FDI inflow declined significantly  
2. Market, per capita income,  
domestic savings:  
(a) Domestic market size / structure 
(b) Links to regional and global 
markets 
(c) Domestic savings Growth 
 
(a) Large domestic market than other cases and strong 
domestic demand 
(b) Strong links to Asian markets as well as global markets 
such as  EU and the US 
(c) High gross domestic savings rate of growth (50% of GDP) 
3. Industrial structure:  
(a) Presence of diverse industrial 
structure  
(b) Strength of domestic firms 
(c) Presence and role of foreign 
firms 
(d) Links to foreign companies/ 
 
(a) Significantly diversified sectors with manufacturing sector 
leading.  But this sector seems to have been the most affected 
sector due to current global crisis. 
(b) Strong domestic firms. They are more conservative 
borrowers. Stock prices fell in response to global crisis.  
(c) Strong presence of foreign firms. Foreign investors 
foreign financial market withdrew funds due to global crisis. 
(c) Strong links to foreign financial market, but Chinese firms 
are not facing serious risks due to this. 
4. Financial Institutions: 
(a) Banking sector 
(b) Role and effectiveness of the 
Central Bank 
(c) Links to foreign financial market 
 
(a) Strong government control over banking and financial 
sector with stringent reserve requirements.  EU and the US 
banking sectors are looking towards Chinese financial sector 
to gain recovery from current crisis. 
(b) Strong central bank with strong capability to meet liquidity 
demands of the financial sector 
(c) Strong links to foreign financial market, but China has 
taken risks in investing in foreign financial markets. 
5. Foreign Trade: 
(a) Nature of exports 
(b) Export markets (Destinations) 
(c) Dependence on commodity 
exports 
 
 
(a) Exports (particularly manufacturing) declined due to 
current recession.  This led to decline in imports and resulted 
in trade surplus. 
(b) Main markets are Asia, EU (7% of GDP), US (8% of 
GDP). 
(c) Less significant dependence on commodity exports.  
6. Skills, R&D, and Technology 
development: 
(a) Investment in education and 
skills (human resources) 
development 
(b) Investment in R&D 
(a) Investment in education and skills has been significant. 
(b) Investment in R&D has been between 0.86 in 2000 to 
0.92% of GDP in 2006 (about 70% by Business enterprises 
and about 25% by the government) 
 
 
 
 
Table 26: Some Major Components of NSI that Could have Mitigating Impact on Recession – 
India 
Components of NSI  Nature/ Level of Presence in National Economy of Brazil 
1. The general investment climate 
and economic policy framework:  
(a)Macroeconomic and social 
stability 
(b) National fiscal policy regime 
(c) Foreign debt 
(d) Inflation 
(e) Interest rate and  
(f) Regulatory regime such as trade 
and tax policies 
(g) Nature and role of FDI  
(a) GDP growth dropped from 9% in 2007 to 7% in 2008, but 
this is still high growth despite global recession  
(b) Current account balance was –2.7% of GDP in 2008 and 
budget deficit has gone up to 6% of GDP in 2008. 
(c) External financing (total bonds, equities, and loans) 
amounted to US$37b in 2008. 
(d) Inflation increased from 4.4% in 2005 to 9% in 2008 
(e) Reduced interest rate / Rupee appreciated significantly 
before the current crisis and depreciated due to global crisis in 
2008. 
(f) Strong regulatory regime; responded to present crisis with 
measures such  change in reserve requirement, providing large 
liquidity, relaxing controls on capital flow,  and foreign 
exchange swaps for banks. 
(g) Significant foreign capital outflow. But FDI inflow is still 
significant. 
2. Market, per capita income,  
domestic savings:  
(a) Domestic market size / structure 
(b) Links to regional and global 
markets 
(c) Domestic savings Growth 
(a) Large domestic market and strong domestic demand 
(b) Strong links to Asian markets,  EU and the US 
(c) High gross domestic savings rate of growth (34.5% of 
GDP in 2008) 
3. Industrial structure:  
(a) Presence of diverse industrial 
structure  
(b) Strength of domestic firms 
(c) Presence and role of foreign 
firms 
(d) Links to foreign companies/ 
foreign financial market 
 
(a) Significantly diversified sectors with trade, transport and 
communications, manufacturing, and financial sectors as 
leading contributors.  All sectors have been growing 
significantly except the agriculture sector. 
(b) Strong domestic firms. Stock prices fell significantly in 
response to global crisis.  
(c) Significant presence of foreign firms selected sectors such 
as technology and services. Foreign investors withdrew funds 
due to global crisis. 
(c) Strong links to foreign financial market, but Indian firms 
took precautions to avoid risks. 
4. Financial Institutions: 
(a) Banking sector 
(b) Role and effectiveness of the 
Central Bank 
(c) Links to foreign financial market 
(a) Strong banking sector, but unwilling to provide financing 
to firms due to global crisis. 
(b) Strong central bank but with relatively less capability 
(unlike central bank in China) to meet liquidity demands of 
the financial sector.  But, it took many initiatives in response 
to current crisis. 
(c) Unlike China, banks in India do not have high exposure to 
US bonds. 
5. Foreign Trade: 
(a) Nature of exports 
(b) Export markets (Destinations) 
(c) Dependence on commodity 
exports 
 
(a) Exports growth declined from 23% in 2007 to 11% in 
2008 due to current recession.  Main exports include 
manufacturing goods, mineral fuels and lubricants. Imports 
also declined significantly. 
(b) Main markets for exports are Asia (50%), EU (39%), 
North America (16%). 
(c) Less significant dependence on commodity exports.  
6. Skills, R&D, and Technology 
development: 
(a) Investment in education and 
skills (human resources) 
development 
(b) Investment in R&D 
 
(a) Investment in education and skills has been between 3 to 
4% of GDP 
(b) Investment in R&D has been between 0.7 to 0.8% of GDP 
(about 20% by Business enterprises and 75% by the 
government) 
 
 
 
8. Some Conclusions 
 
On the NSI side we took six variables such as macroeconomic stability, market structure, per 
capita income and domestic savings, industrial structure, financial institutions, foreign trade and 
skills, R&D and Technology development as relevant indicators of how changes in these 
indicators is correlated to the impact of the recession as much as these can be read through the 
available data. 
 
On the mitigating capability side we correlated whether the actions taken are defensive by taking 
measures like imposing protection, reduction in bank lending, consumer fear to spend and save 
and even hoard, reducing expenditure on R & D, reducing imports and finding new markets for 
reduced exports as a result of the recessionary downturn and changes in public policy. 
 
What emerges from the four transition countries is that the recessionary impact has forced 
behaviour for the regulatory tightening by Government and reduction by banks in lending to 
firms and other factors that are due to the recession. Whilst the recession has induced such 
behaviour, the basic elements of the NSI appear to function to bring about and overcome the 
recessionary downturn by taking macroeconomic stability without imposing stringent policies of 
control, restricting markets, domestic demand and per capita income, tampering with the strategy 
of diversifying the industrial structure, and changing the central bank, the banking sector and 
their relations to the foreign capital, currency  and money markets, reduced exports without 
changing mainly the destination of the pre-recessionary export markets, and continuing to fund 
education, skills development and R & D. 
 
It looks nearly all of the transition countries have their GDP still growing whether the rate is 
reduced or not showing a quality of NSI that is strong. China had a big stimulus package to fight 
the global recession whilst the other three Brazil, India and South Africa took steps to deal with 
the recession not with a massive stimulus but varied regulatory and active policy measures. 
 
Overall the assumption we had that countries in transition are evolving strong NSI that can cope 
with recessionary downturn appears to be borne out by the available data and the six identified 
NSI characteristics, showing despite the problems, the economies are broadly on course to see 
this recession and through and come out stronger. 
 
Initial study on the BRICS reveals that the approach and perspective of using not just isolated 
variables like financial institutions and banking sector in the economy as the main factors for 
understanding and finding remedies to overcome the recessionary economic down turn.  What 
comes forcefully is how important it is to frame the challenge of the recession by using the NSI 
of a country. Very often when we look at the discussions of recession, the NSI is not used. What 
we have done here is to bring the NSI to the forefront to look at both political and economic 
system and its ability to respond to the recessionary tide.  We think it in itself is an original 
contribution relating not just single institutions but the NSI as a whole in relation to estimating 
the capability of the country to work its way out of the global recession. 
 
The second major contribution is the policy learning that is needed when global recession 
confronts specific NSI.  What we can say now from the policy side is that there is a need for 
integrated policy response (taking into account all the 6 sets of NSI components that we have 
identified in our conceptual framework) not an ad-hoc or compartmentalised approach (e.g. 
tinkering trade or banking regulations, or fiscal policy) to overcoming the crisis. Such integrated 
policy approach that takes all the relevant NSI components into account will be far more robust 
in responding to and managing the impact of any global recessionary crisis. 
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